I read a lot of articles that come across my subscribed feeds. Occasionally one gets me worked up, and occasionally I'm able to find the time to write about it. Unfortunately it's usually the one's where someone screwed up bad and someone got hurt or killed.
Well, I came across an article of someone who has the right mentality towards safety and is trying to do something about it. What got me worked up in this case is that THE VERY PEOPLE HE'S TRYING TO PROTECT ARE CHALLENGING HIS ACTIONS!
Here is the article:
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/New_emphasison_safety_upsets_some_firefighters.html
In summary, the San Antonio chief, Charles Hood, wants to implement a policy where the Incident Commander makes a determination as to whether an interior attack and/or search should be conducted.
This is so fundamentally obvious to me that it should not even require elaboration. But apparently the culture in San Antonio, as elsewhere, has not yet caught up to the times. They still believe that rushing blindly into a building to save the victims that might or might not even be there, or might or might not already be dead, is an acceptable risk.
Apparently their logic is that no fire fighter has died in that manner in San Antonio before, so "if it isn't broke, don't fix it". (Direct quote from the president of their firefighter's union). That's exactly the attitude Charleston had before they lost 9 firefighters in a single incident. They thought since they've gotten away with their practices in the past, it "wasn't broke". Sadly, we know now the truth.
I recently wrote a posting about the Houston tragedy where 2 firefighters were lost in exactly this situation. There were no known victims, in fact the home owners and neighbors specifically told them there was no one inside. But they had to do an aggressive interior attack and search and rescue, because that's what they do. And no one had been hurt before. "it ain't broke, right?"
It's this type of thinking that gets firefighters into trouble. Kudos to Chief Hood and his efforts to make a difference in his department. He had initiated his policy prior to the Houston tragedy. I can only hope that it will be a lesson to all departments everywhere to CONSTANTLY make evaluations of their practices to ensure they are the safest and best practices for the current conditions and trends. Don't fall victim to the "it ain't broke" or "we've always done it that way" syndrome.
I am disheartened that anyone could challenge such clear and progressive thinking. I find it hard to believe that firefighters don't understand risking their lives for little to nothing in return is worthless.
I am encouraged that the wheels are in motion in San Antonio. The community leadership has clearly made the first step by hiring Chief Hood. He came from Phoenix fire, known for their leadership in the firefighter community, especially in regard to safety. They could have hired someone from within who would continue the same old practices they have always done. And Chief Hood is clearly taking the right steps. I have no doubt that he will be successful. People are always averse to change. There will always be detractors who don't want to do the right thing because it's so much easier to keep doing what you've always been doing. Someone as enlightened and motivated as Chief Hood will find a way to get it done. I wish him and the San Antonio department luck in continuing to evolve along with the times and provide the best level of service possible for their residents and firefighters.
I commend Chief Hood for taking on this battle, and I look forward to seeing the ultimate outcome. I am confident the San Antonio Fire Department will be a better place as a result. And I look forward to the day when all departments everywhere get the 'big picture'. I just hope we don't have to needlessly kill more firefighters to make it happen.
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Tough Month for Houston Fire
It might be time for Houston Fire to have an honest, impartial, outside assessment of their operations. In the past month there has been a serious apparatus collision that seriously injured many firefighters and killed a pedestrian, and now two firefighters have died in a house fire. From early reports it sounds like the fire was large and was fed by high winds, and that the initial arriving units were advised that everyone was out of the house. In other words there was nothing to risk.
One chief was quoted as saying "Let me paint a picture for you. If that’s what that person said, there’s more than one neighbor, Another neighbor, knowing they’re elderly, may have thought he could go in and probably assist them if they were still inside. If that were the case, there’s somebody inside."
You can play "what ifs" all day long. The accepted practice is to take the actual facts on the line, and not to take unnecessary risks, especially when there is nothing to gain.
By the same argument, there could have been a bomb in the house, or a natural gas leak. Both situations that would have called for not going interior. So that argument doesn't really hold water.
I understand the difficulty in making on the spot command decisions. It's an extremely difficult thing to do. And I can appreciate being aggressive. But clearly the culture of each department carries through to each incident. If they had practiced safe techniques in training and smaller incidents, they may have realized this wasn't the time to go charging into a fully evolved structure with high winds and no known victims.
According to witnesses, the flames had already breached the structure and were 30 to 40 feet in the air. Even if there had been victims, they were not viable victims and therefore worth risking firefighters lives for.
These types of comments indicate to me that it's time to do an appraisal of the department's practices, similar to what was done in Charlston following their tragedy. It was a difficult transition for them to make, but they and their citizens are better off for it. These recent incidents, in conjunction with similar incidents over the past few years, indicate changes need to be made. They have encountered far more than their share of tragedies. Some situations are not entirely preventable. Firefighters dying in fires and fatal apparatus wrecks are preventable. I hope these deaths are not in vain, and the Houston Fire department and all fire departments everywhere learn from these mistakes and are better prepared for future incidents as a result.
One chief was quoted as saying "Let me paint a picture for you. If that’s what that person said, there’s more than one neighbor, Another neighbor, knowing they’re elderly, may have thought he could go in and probably assist them if they were still inside. If that were the case, there’s somebody inside."
You can play "what ifs" all day long. The accepted practice is to take the actual facts on the line, and not to take unnecessary risks, especially when there is nothing to gain.
By the same argument, there could have been a bomb in the house, or a natural gas leak. Both situations that would have called for not going interior. So that argument doesn't really hold water.
I understand the difficulty in making on the spot command decisions. It's an extremely difficult thing to do. And I can appreciate being aggressive. But clearly the culture of each department carries through to each incident. If they had practiced safe techniques in training and smaller incidents, they may have realized this wasn't the time to go charging into a fully evolved structure with high winds and no known victims.
According to witnesses, the flames had already breached the structure and were 30 to 40 feet in the air. Even if there had been victims, they were not viable victims and therefore worth risking firefighters lives for.
These types of comments indicate to me that it's time to do an appraisal of the department's practices, similar to what was done in Charlston following their tragedy. It was a difficult transition for them to make, but they and their citizens are better off for it. These recent incidents, in conjunction with similar incidents over the past few years, indicate changes need to be made. They have encountered far more than their share of tragedies. Some situations are not entirely preventable. Firefighters dying in fires and fatal apparatus wrecks are preventable. I hope these deaths are not in vain, and the Houston Fire department and all fire departments everywhere learn from these mistakes and are better prepared for future incidents as a result.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Some Fire Service History
I've been horribly negligent about writing in this blog. There are many topics I could be writing about, and I'm going to make an effort to do so more regularly. So I will start by sharing some information that I probably wouldn't normally share. Hopefully this will provide some value to anyone reading it, and also get me into the habit of posting more often.
Recently our station watched an inspirational key note speech from the annual FDIC conference. It was presented by Seattle Chief Mike Gagliano. The speech was about the spirit of the fire service, and how everyone should be proud of being involved, and to understand the history of how we got to where we are.
This was particularly relevant to my station. I have been talking a lot lately with my fellow firefighters and officers about how our station seems to have lost some of our team edge and cohesiveness. The video did a great job of reinforcing some of the concepts behind that, and hopefully it will start to motivate our firefighters to take some more pride in themselves and our station.
As part of that speech, he recommended getting to know the history of the fire service. Why we do some of the things we do, and we take for granted. To understand the history and take some pride in some of our rituals.
He mentioned things like the maltese cross, why we have bugles on our collars for officers, etc. I didn't know the answers to these questions. So I have taken upon myself to do a little research and share this.
Fire officers in dress uniform are traditionally indicated by bugles on their collars. The more bugles, the higher the rank. So how did this tradition get started?
Communication is vital to anything involving more than 1 human being. That's obviously true of firefighting as well. Communicating orders on the fire ground allows the incident command to maintain control and to assign actions to control the scene.
Today our method of communication on the fire ground is by two way radio. We have established protocols about who should communicate and how. Of course, radios have not always been available to the fire service. Many decades ago, there was no such thing as radio communication. And even once radios were invented, it was quite a while before portable radios were available and affordable enough to be used by the fire service.
So how did the officers in charge communicate and relay their orders? They would use big old megaphones. Just like the big cones you might see cheerleaders use. They would shout their orders through the megaphones to the firefighters. Only officers were allowed to use them. Because of course the firefighters couldn't carry them to communicate back. So the officers in charge would setup their command post (although they probably didn't call it that back then), and use the megaphones to shout their orders.
Since the megaphones were identified strictly with the officers, it was natural to use them as a symbol of the officer's rank. So bugles were used as insignia on the collars of the officers.
That's just a little bit of information that I thought I would share regarding the brass we adorn ourselves with.
Recently our station watched an inspirational key note speech from the annual FDIC conference. It was presented by Seattle Chief Mike Gagliano. The speech was about the spirit of the fire service, and how everyone should be proud of being involved, and to understand the history of how we got to where we are.
This was particularly relevant to my station. I have been talking a lot lately with my fellow firefighters and officers about how our station seems to have lost some of our team edge and cohesiveness. The video did a great job of reinforcing some of the concepts behind that, and hopefully it will start to motivate our firefighters to take some more pride in themselves and our station.
As part of that speech, he recommended getting to know the history of the fire service. Why we do some of the things we do, and we take for granted. To understand the history and take some pride in some of our rituals.
He mentioned things like the maltese cross, why we have bugles on our collars for officers, etc. I didn't know the answers to these questions. So I have taken upon myself to do a little research and share this.
Fire officers in dress uniform are traditionally indicated by bugles on their collars. The more bugles, the higher the rank. So how did this tradition get started?
Communication is vital to anything involving more than 1 human being. That's obviously true of firefighting as well. Communicating orders on the fire ground allows the incident command to maintain control and to assign actions to control the scene.
Today our method of communication on the fire ground is by two way radio. We have established protocols about who should communicate and how. Of course, radios have not always been available to the fire service. Many decades ago, there was no such thing as radio communication. And even once radios were invented, it was quite a while before portable radios were available and affordable enough to be used by the fire service.
So how did the officers in charge communicate and relay their orders? They would use big old megaphones. Just like the big cones you might see cheerleaders use. They would shout their orders through the megaphones to the firefighters. Only officers were allowed to use them. Because of course the firefighters couldn't carry them to communicate back. So the officers in charge would setup their command post (although they probably didn't call it that back then), and use the megaphones to shout their orders.
Since the megaphones were identified strictly with the officers, it was natural to use them as a symbol of the officer's rank. So bugles were used as insignia on the collars of the officers.
That's just a little bit of information that I thought I would share regarding the brass we adorn ourselves with.
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
More Details on Charleston Tragedy
Sadly, as I expected more details are coming to light that do indicate there was potentially some serious negligence that led to the tragedy. Based upon the statements and facts I'm hearing, there is a serious problem with the Charleston fire department. This was not a single event tragedy, this was an inevitability.
From what I've heard, and from quotes from Charleston command staff, they have not kept up with current guidelines, and even worse seem to indicate ignorance and hostility towards the way the fire service in general has determined is the best way to plan and handle emergencies.
This is unfortunate. There have been many great strides in the way fire emergencies are handled in the last 10 years or so. And the 9/11 tragedy forced us to deal with some issues, and implement proper solutions, and even more importantly created some standards that we can all live by. The goal is not only to prevent further injuries and deaths, but to be prepared for the worst should another national disaster or terrorist event occur.
Since 9/11 Federal guidelines have been put in place that all fire departments are required to comply with. Additionally states have requirements of their own. Sadly, Charleston appears to have been in the dark about these requirements, and 9 firefighters paid the ultimate price for this.
Almost certainly they will receive serious reprimands, and most likely hefty fines from federal organizations such as OSHA, NIOSH, etc. I personally feel there should also be criminal charges for those responsible.
While reading some of the news accounts, some shocking details have emerged. Shocking to me, but apparently they have a deer in the headlights mentality in Charleston, because they just don't quite understand the severity of their actions.
One detail is that it is apparently standard operating procedure for an Incident Commander (IC) to enter a fire structure and become involved with fire operations. The federally mandated NIMS (National Incident Management System) makes the role of the IC quite clear. They are the head coach, they don't get to play in the game. They need to keep the big picture in mind, and communicate to the firefighters the tasks to be carried out.
The IC who was initially in charge of the fire, Assistant Fire Chief Larry Garvin, has been quoted as saying he entered the structure on several occasions to "look for the fire". That is the role of the firefighter, to report back to IC so IC can then make strategic and tactical decisions based upon all of the info. There were internal and external operations going on, by getting involved in the minor details of the operations, he was seriously overlooking the big picture.
Another fact that Charleston has had their head buried in the sand is that they have an SOP that dictates whenever a higher ranking officer arrives on the scene, they automatically become command (IC). This is fine in concept, but the problem is with how they implement it. NIMS dictates that a formal transfer of command must occur. This must be verbal, and recorded. All units on scene must be aware of this change in command. Most importantly the new IC must be informed by the former IC of all strategic and tactical operations, and the status of each. This is something that the Charleston FD does not practice.
This may not have directly led to the tragedy, or have been able to prevent it if implemented, but it's a sign of a problem. The tragedy is the culmination of many of these failure factors.
Another problem was related to the building construction. As I mentioned in my first post about this event, building construction is a vital piece of information for how a fire will behave. I still do not have enough facts about their education about construction types, I'm sure that will come. I certainly hope they are educated about the dangers of various types of construction.
The construction type of the building that collapsed was steel truss. This is exactly the type of construction that I thought the building was, and is one of the most dangerous. Every firefighter should understand the dangers of this construction type, and with 100% certainty every single IC should have a full understanding of it as well.
What dismays me is that the Sofa Super Store was pre-planned. This is a vital part of planning, especially for potentially dangerous locations. The entire point of doing a pre-plan is to plan for the worst and determine how we will handle certain events. This is also an opportunity to warn ourselves about things that we might not notice while in the heat of battle, like the fact the building has a steel truss roof.
What's particularly alarming here is that the pre-plan was created by the same individual who was IC for the first portion of the fire, Larry Garvin. There was no indication of construction type in the preplan. What a valuable asset for the IC to have conducted a pre-plan and determined ahead of time a game plan for handling it. That was a lost opportunity in this case.
Fire fighting is not an exact science, and every emergency is different. That can be difficult to handle. We try to manage this difficult situation with planning and education. A department's leadership is crucial in carrying this out. There are a couple of comments that indicate to me that perhaps the Charleston leadership is questionable. I realize they are dealing with a difficult time, but there are a couple of things I'd like to point out.
When head Fire Chief Rusty Thomas was asked whether he felt his department was in line with Federal and State regulations, his response was "I don't know. I know we have our own". That comment sends chills down my spine. For a fire chief responsible for the safety and livelihood of many individuals who want to learn how to best help people and handle emergencies to not even know if he's in compliance. To me that seems like blind ignorance. Not the type of person I want to follow, particularly charging into a burning building at his behest.
Chief Thomas also indicated that sending the IC into a building, something he admits they do often, does not compromise his commander's ability. This is something that is completely contradictory to what the current line of thinking is, and has been emphasized through such requirements as NIMS. NIOSH has reported in similar previous incidents that this is a contributing factor to disasters such as this, and is something to be avoided. I have no doubt the same will be said for this incident when the report is final.
The last comment I heard that really got me upset was once again Chief Thomas. When asked about the transfer of command process and his departments lack of compliance with recommended practices, he responded "I'm just going to let you know we have our own incident command system. We have it written that the highest-ranking official is automatically in charge. I don't care how it is anyplace else." That indicates to me that his head is firmly buried in the sand, and he is not interested in ensuring that his department is doing everything they can to implement the best and safest procedures for their department and community.
The problem's here are sadly probably not that uncommon. It's really the sum total of the failures that caused this circumstance. I don't mean to sound overly critical, but some of these comments really upset me. My belief is that nearly every firefighter injury and death is completely preventable. Hearing what I've heard thus far about this incident, it only confirms my beliefs. If they had been proactive rather than status-quo about their policies and procedures, I believe any one of the failure points that led to this tragedy could have prevented these firefighter deaths.
Let us hope that the publicity this event has generated will result in not only the Charleston fire department reevaluating their attitude and policies, but also the many other departments out there that have been living by the same beliefs.
There is not a single department out there that has it all figured out and can assume they are doing things correctly. We must constantly adapt, improve, educate ourselves, and work together with others in the fire service to make our jobs safer. It is a never-ending battle. Unlike Chief Thomas, I do care how everyone else is doing it.
From what I've heard, and from quotes from Charleston command staff, they have not kept up with current guidelines, and even worse seem to indicate ignorance and hostility towards the way the fire service in general has determined is the best way to plan and handle emergencies.
This is unfortunate. There have been many great strides in the way fire emergencies are handled in the last 10 years or so. And the 9/11 tragedy forced us to deal with some issues, and implement proper solutions, and even more importantly created some standards that we can all live by. The goal is not only to prevent further injuries and deaths, but to be prepared for the worst should another national disaster or terrorist event occur.
Since 9/11 Federal guidelines have been put in place that all fire departments are required to comply with. Additionally states have requirements of their own. Sadly, Charleston appears to have been in the dark about these requirements, and 9 firefighters paid the ultimate price for this.
Almost certainly they will receive serious reprimands, and most likely hefty fines from federal organizations such as OSHA, NIOSH, etc. I personally feel there should also be criminal charges for those responsible.
While reading some of the news accounts, some shocking details have emerged. Shocking to me, but apparently they have a deer in the headlights mentality in Charleston, because they just don't quite understand the severity of their actions.
One detail is that it is apparently standard operating procedure for an Incident Commander (IC) to enter a fire structure and become involved with fire operations. The federally mandated NIMS (National Incident Management System) makes the role of the IC quite clear. They are the head coach, they don't get to play in the game. They need to keep the big picture in mind, and communicate to the firefighters the tasks to be carried out.
The IC who was initially in charge of the fire, Assistant Fire Chief Larry Garvin, has been quoted as saying he entered the structure on several occasions to "look for the fire". That is the role of the firefighter, to report back to IC so IC can then make strategic and tactical decisions based upon all of the info. There were internal and external operations going on, by getting involved in the minor details of the operations, he was seriously overlooking the big picture.
Another fact that Charleston has had their head buried in the sand is that they have an SOP that dictates whenever a higher ranking officer arrives on the scene, they automatically become command (IC). This is fine in concept, but the problem is with how they implement it. NIMS dictates that a formal transfer of command must occur. This must be verbal, and recorded. All units on scene must be aware of this change in command. Most importantly the new IC must be informed by the former IC of all strategic and tactical operations, and the status of each. This is something that the Charleston FD does not practice.
This may not have directly led to the tragedy, or have been able to prevent it if implemented, but it's a sign of a problem. The tragedy is the culmination of many of these failure factors.
Another problem was related to the building construction. As I mentioned in my first post about this event, building construction is a vital piece of information for how a fire will behave. I still do not have enough facts about their education about construction types, I'm sure that will come. I certainly hope they are educated about the dangers of various types of construction.
The construction type of the building that collapsed was steel truss. This is exactly the type of construction that I thought the building was, and is one of the most dangerous. Every firefighter should understand the dangers of this construction type, and with 100% certainty every single IC should have a full understanding of it as well.
What dismays me is that the Sofa Super Store was pre-planned. This is a vital part of planning, especially for potentially dangerous locations. The entire point of doing a pre-plan is to plan for the worst and determine how we will handle certain events. This is also an opportunity to warn ourselves about things that we might not notice while in the heat of battle, like the fact the building has a steel truss roof.
What's particularly alarming here is that the pre-plan was created by the same individual who was IC for the first portion of the fire, Larry Garvin. There was no indication of construction type in the preplan. What a valuable asset for the IC to have conducted a pre-plan and determined ahead of time a game plan for handling it. That was a lost opportunity in this case.
Fire fighting is not an exact science, and every emergency is different. That can be difficult to handle. We try to manage this difficult situation with planning and education. A department's leadership is crucial in carrying this out. There are a couple of comments that indicate to me that perhaps the Charleston leadership is questionable. I realize they are dealing with a difficult time, but there are a couple of things I'd like to point out.
When head Fire Chief Rusty Thomas was asked whether he felt his department was in line with Federal and State regulations, his response was "I don't know. I know we have our own". That comment sends chills down my spine. For a fire chief responsible for the safety and livelihood of many individuals who want to learn how to best help people and handle emergencies to not even know if he's in compliance. To me that seems like blind ignorance. Not the type of person I want to follow, particularly charging into a burning building at his behest.
Chief Thomas also indicated that sending the IC into a building, something he admits they do often, does not compromise his commander's ability. This is something that is completely contradictory to what the current line of thinking is, and has been emphasized through such requirements as NIMS. NIOSH has reported in similar previous incidents that this is a contributing factor to disasters such as this, and is something to be avoided. I have no doubt the same will be said for this incident when the report is final.
The last comment I heard that really got me upset was once again Chief Thomas. When asked about the transfer of command process and his departments lack of compliance with recommended practices, he responded "I'm just going to let you know we have our own incident command system. We have it written that the highest-ranking official is automatically in charge. I don't care how it is anyplace else." That indicates to me that his head is firmly buried in the sand, and he is not interested in ensuring that his department is doing everything they can to implement the best and safest procedures for their department and community.
The problem's here are sadly probably not that uncommon. It's really the sum total of the failures that caused this circumstance. I don't mean to sound overly critical, but some of these comments really upset me. My belief is that nearly every firefighter injury and death is completely preventable. Hearing what I've heard thus far about this incident, it only confirms my beliefs. If they had been proactive rather than status-quo about their policies and procedures, I believe any one of the failure points that led to this tragedy could have prevented these firefighter deaths.
Let us hope that the publicity this event has generated will result in not only the Charleston fire department reevaluating their attitude and policies, but also the many other departments out there that have been living by the same beliefs.
There is not a single department out there that has it all figured out and can assume they are doing things correctly. We must constantly adapt, improve, educate ourselves, and work together with others in the fire service to make our jobs safer. It is a never-ending battle. Unlike Chief Thomas, I do care how everyone else is doing it.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Fire Tragedy
The recent tragedy in Charleston, SC that killed 9 firefighters is a stark reminder of the dangers of firefighting. Their sacrifice is truly tragic. And almost certainly it was preventable.
The United States fire service seems to be more "tolerant" of fire risk than other countries. Our firefighter morality rates are generally higher than most other countries in the world. This should not be necessary. Every single firefighter death should be preventable in some way.
Nearly every year the statistics are the same. On average around 100 firefighters are dying. What's really telling is that this is grossly disproportionate to the general long term trend of decreasing emergencies and fires.
Why are we so tolerant of firefighter deaths? Not only should our mortality rates be declining in proportion to the decrease in fires, shouldn't we also see an added reduction in injuries and deaths due to our increased technology and training? It's not happening.
Getting back to the Charleston fire, I haven't heard many of the details. To the best of my knowledge many of these details are either currently unknown, or have yet to be released.
OSHA investigates each firefighter death, as well as NIOSH. I like to read the NIOSH reports. They detail what happened, how it happened, and what should be done to prevent similar accidents in the future. It amazes me at the things they detail in their report. Most of the time it turns out to be things that should be incredibly obvious. Like wearing your seat belt. Or using equipment properly, and maintaining equipment and apparatus. Many times it comes down to general training and safety issues.
Based upon what I do know about the Charleston fire, my personal belief is that this was definitely preventable. I'm sure there will be details to come out to alter my opinion in one way or another. For example, I listened to the released 911 tapes. It was only the police tapes, but from them I was able to hear reports of multiple trapped victims (which was contrary to initial reports of no one inside).
A trapped victim changes things dramatically. That gives us a reason as firefighters to be
in a burning building. Although we can never accept trading our own lives for those of the initial victims. From the rough time line I got from the 911 tapes, however, it sounded like the victims were rescued early in the incident.
So why were there 9 firefighters in a heavily involved building? Another important detail is that the building collapsed at least an hour an a half after the initial report. That's a long time for fire to build.
Building construction is a vital part of how a fire plays out. I'm not familiar with the details of the collapsed building's construction type, or the generally accepted construction types of that region. But based upon the type of store, and the end result, my guess is that it was some sort of lightweight construction.
Lightweight construction is great for the building owner. It greatly reduces the amount of construction materials necessary to build a building. It provides strengths equal to or greater than older construction methods which relied on a great deal of material. It's a win-win, right? Wrong. The one weakness in lightweight construction is that because of the reduction in the amount of material, buildings will fail much, much sooner under fire load.
In fact, I live by the belief that a lightweight construction building can fail within 10 minutes of fire load. And the most common outcome of failure in these types of buildings is a roof collapse. There is really no warning of these types of failures. The roof fails all at once.
This sounds a lot like what happened in Charleston. I really hope the Incident Commander and crew leaders were well versed in the dangers of lightweight construction, and took this into account. Unfortunately, I think it was overlooked, or even worse was not something they were even fully aware of. If it was, this was a completely preventable tragedy. In fact nearly every tragedy should be preventable.
Everyone from the IC down to the probie on the interior crew, should be aware of how building construction affects our response. If 9 were killed, there were likely others in the building at the same time. Did any one of them think about all of that fire load, and how it was affecting the structure? If all of the victims were out of the building, what were firefighters still doing inside? There was nothing to be gained, the building was well past it's deductible and was going to be a total loss. There was heavy fire load (it was a Sofa store: lots and lots of synthetic materials). After an hour and a half, even a traditional heavy construction building would be nearing the failure point. Why did this tragedy need to happen?
It may be a year before we hear a full report from NIOSH. I hope these firefighters did not die in vain. One thing that has definitely resulted is a lot of publicity from this event. 9 firefighters is a large number, even for us in the US. It is garnering attention. Let's hope at least the fire community can learn from this and prevent future tragedies from happening.
The United States fire service seems to be more "tolerant" of fire risk than other countries. Our firefighter morality rates are generally higher than most other countries in the world. This should not be necessary. Every single firefighter death should be preventable in some way.
Nearly every year the statistics are the same. On average around 100 firefighters are dying. What's really telling is that this is grossly disproportionate to the general long term trend of decreasing emergencies and fires.
Why are we so tolerant of firefighter deaths? Not only should our mortality rates be declining in proportion to the decrease in fires, shouldn't we also see an added reduction in injuries and deaths due to our increased technology and training? It's not happening.
Getting back to the Charleston fire, I haven't heard many of the details. To the best of my knowledge many of these details are either currently unknown, or have yet to be released.
OSHA investigates each firefighter death, as well as NIOSH. I like to read the NIOSH reports. They detail what happened, how it happened, and what should be done to prevent similar accidents in the future. It amazes me at the things they detail in their report. Most of the time it turns out to be things that should be incredibly obvious. Like wearing your seat belt. Or using equipment properly, and maintaining equipment and apparatus. Many times it comes down to general training and safety issues.
Based upon what I do know about the Charleston fire, my personal belief is that this was definitely preventable. I'm sure there will be details to come out to alter my opinion in one way or another. For example, I listened to the released 911 tapes. It was only the police tapes, but from them I was able to hear reports of multiple trapped victims (which was contrary to initial reports of no one inside).
A trapped victim changes things dramatically. That gives us a reason as firefighters to be
in a burning building. Although we can never accept trading our own lives for those of the initial victims. From the rough time line I got from the 911 tapes, however, it sounded like the victims were rescued early in the incident.
So why were there 9 firefighters in a heavily involved building? Another important detail is that the building collapsed at least an hour an a half after the initial report. That's a long time for fire to build.
Building construction is a vital part of how a fire plays out. I'm not familiar with the details of the collapsed building's construction type, or the generally accepted construction types of that region. But based upon the type of store, and the end result, my guess is that it was some sort of lightweight construction.
Lightweight construction is great for the building owner. It greatly reduces the amount of construction materials necessary to build a building. It provides strengths equal to or greater than older construction methods which relied on a great deal of material. It's a win-win, right? Wrong. The one weakness in lightweight construction is that because of the reduction in the amount of material, buildings will fail much, much sooner under fire load.
In fact, I live by the belief that a lightweight construction building can fail within 10 minutes of fire load. And the most common outcome of failure in these types of buildings is a roof collapse. There is really no warning of these types of failures. The roof fails all at once.
This sounds a lot like what happened in Charleston. I really hope the Incident Commander and crew leaders were well versed in the dangers of lightweight construction, and took this into account. Unfortunately, I think it was overlooked, or even worse was not something they were even fully aware of. If it was, this was a completely preventable tragedy. In fact nearly every tragedy should be preventable.
Everyone from the IC down to the probie on the interior crew, should be aware of how building construction affects our response. If 9 were killed, there were likely others in the building at the same time. Did any one of them think about all of that fire load, and how it was affecting the structure? If all of the victims were out of the building, what were firefighters still doing inside? There was nothing to be gained, the building was well past it's deductible and was going to be a total loss. There was heavy fire load (it was a Sofa store: lots and lots of synthetic materials). After an hour and a half, even a traditional heavy construction building would be nearing the failure point. Why did this tragedy need to happen?
It may be a year before we hear a full report from NIOSH. I hope these firefighters did not die in vain. One thing that has definitely resulted is a lot of publicity from this event. 9 firefighters is a large number, even for us in the US. It is garnering attention. Let's hope at least the fire community can learn from this and prevent future tragedies from happening.
Thursday, May 10, 2007
Practice Makes Perfect
[Note: This is a blog post first published 2/21/2005. It is being reposted here because my old blog account is no longer valid]
In the fire service, you can't possibly practice every scenario you will be faced with throughout your firefighting career. By it's very nature the fire service deals with chaos. So sometimes one of the best ways of preparing yourself is to subject yourself to "organized chaos". We just completed one such exercise, a controlled burn.
Our city,
Recently there have been 2 reasons for building demolitions via a controlled burn. One is a building that has been around for many years, and has been condemned. These are rare these days. The second is a perfectly good property that is being leveled to make way for a new, profitable development. This is becoming more prevalent here in
Our burn yesterday falls under the other category: Condemned Property. We are an old farming community. Today there is very little "prairie" left in
The house scheduled for demolition was a very old farm house on a prime piece of property. Right in it's backyard is a large community woodland park and small lake. The house is of balloon construction with a stucco exterior. The interior was very deteriorated. The plaster and lathe ceiling was sagging badly, and in several places had already fallen through. There was very little, if any, insulation. A situation ripe for spreading a fire. So in preparation for us getting some training experience out of the burn, we spent some time sheet-rocking the ceilings to prevent spread into the tinder-box attic. A precaution that was wise, but was not fully successful.
As we arrived at our Fire Station 1 for a briefing at 05:30, our training chief explained our team assignments and training objectives. Noteworthy items were the concern with the attic, and that we would be presented with a demonstration with a new type of foam.
Foam is a very important advancement in fire science. It has been around for many years now, but advancements are constantly being made and worked on. The particular brand of foam we have been using for year, manufactured by 3M, has been discontinued. We are now looking for a replacement. We currently carry Class A foam in our pumper's foam tanks, which we can use on the majority of the calls we receive. The foam changes the properties of water to make it "better" at cooling, extinguishing and controlling a fire. Class B foam is also important for use in flammable liquid fires. The foam creates a blanket over the liquid, smothering the fire. We have to carry class B foam separately, just in case we need it. The foam demonstration we received was for a combination A&B foam that would allow us to not need to carry 2 separate kinds of foam.
As we arrived at the old house at 06:00, we got to work. My crew was assigned one of the more labor-intensive tasks. This would become a motif throughout the day, it seems. We layed a supply line of 5in LDH (Large Diameter Hose) to the nearest Fire Hydrant. Since we require 2 sources of water, including a backup water source, we also setup a drop-tank. The drop tank is a square, self-standing pool that holds several hundred gallons of water. The second Engine in used Hard Suction intake hose to draw from this secondary water source should something happen to the primary water source or pumper.
We also hooked 200 feet of 2 1/2 inch hose to a gated wye. A gated wye takes one line, and splits it into 2. In our case we split off two 1 3/4 inch handlines, which would be used for attack. The gated wye allows us to charge the line, and control the water supply at the wye by using the gate valves on each output. We also laid another 200 foot section of 1 3/4 inch as a backup.
In anticipation of the attic being a threat, another crew cut a hole in the roof for vertical ventilation. During a real fire, if the fire conditions call for it, a hole is cut into the roof. Since heated gases and smoke accumulate quickly in the attic of a house fire, we want to vent these gases. Otherwise the heat and gases will continue to buildup, helping to spread the fire and make extinguishment even more difficult. Since heat rises, a hole allows for vertical escape of these gases, thus the term vertical ventilation. Horizontal ventilation also exists, and is used far more frequently. It is used primarily for smoke removal.
Once we were all prepared, we made a tour of the house in advance, as required by OSHA. That takes a lot of fun out of the experience, and a lot of realism as well. In a real fire you are navigating your way through a strange home, filled with contents you are unaware of since you can't see due to smoke, and trying to find the source of the fire, which is in origins usually unknown. While a training burn is great because it allows us to use combustible materials in a home, we know the layout of the house in advance, there are no contents beyond those which we will be burning, and you typically know exactly where the fire will be. But it's still funner than classroom training any day.
Since I, and a few other firefighters, had helped with preparation of the home a few days earlier, my Lieutenant had said he would try to get us on the first crew in on attack. I'm not sure if that was the reason why I was on the first crew, or if it was just coincidence, but that's where I was none-the-less. Being the first in is desirable because nothing has been disturbed yet, and we're the crew with the greatest likelihood of getting multiple attack evolutions. We weren't sure how many evolutions we would get in this old structure. We were hoping for 7 or 8, which would get us in there twice since there were 6 crews.
My crew had 2 rookies on it, so we put one on the nozzle, and the other right behind him as backup. That left me in third position with the thermal imager, and a Lieutenant behind me. Since I had the thermal imager, I would most likely be the only person with any sort of visual idea of what was happening with the fire.
We made entry, and advanced the line up the stairs and quickly located the fire room. We could see the fire room through the window on the entry side. And since it's a controlled burn, we knew it was the only room on fire. This information, in addition to knowing the layout of the house, resulted in us knowing far more information about the fire conditions than we would in any real fire. Consequently, we were in the fire room in under 10 seconds of entering the structure.
The conditions were extremely smoky, and the hallway and fire room were very small. The rookie on the nozzle quickly hit the fire, which immediately disturbed the thermal layering. Since heat rises, a fire left undisturbed will have the smokiest and hottest gases near the ceiling. They then bank down slowly as heat builds. Eventually the fire will "self-vent" by breaking a window due to heat, or it will burn it's way through the ceiling. When we hit it with water, the intense heat causes most of the water to turn to steam. Since water expands to 1700 times it's original volume when converted to steam, the thermal layer is disturbed, and the heat and gas is distributed throughout the room.
My job with the thermal imager was to instruct and inform the crew about the location and condition of the fire. After the initial short burst of water, the flames are quickly knocked down. Due to the steam and smoke, I could barely see the thermal imaging monitor, which was inches from my face. I wiped my SCBA mask and thermal screen, and saw that it was knocked down, but was still glowing hot. An officer called for hydraulic ventilation. A window was knocked out, and the nozzle is brought to the opening and put on a moderate fog stream. The water flowing out the window creates a draft effect, drawing most of the smoke and heat out of the window.
Of course an open window also draws in fresh oxygen, so the smoldering fire suddenly flared up with the introduction of fresh O2. It was quickly burning strongly again. We hit it again. Watching through the thermal I could see that it was not being hit properly. So I had to relay instructions to remove a palette that was obstructing the stream. I also had to direct the nozzleman to move his stream down and left to hit the seat of the fire.
After several evolutions of knocking it down, pulling off charred contents to find more fire, then hitting it again, we finally retreated from the structure and moved to the relief area to change our air bottles and get a quick break before we were put to work on another assignment.
That didn't last long, as I was pulled from relief to monitor the roof of the structure with a thermal imager from the outside to check for extension into the roof. After several minutes of the 2nd attack crew in the structure, suddenly heavy black smoke was emanating out of the ventilation hole on the roof. A clear sign of fire. The building was balloon construction, which means that it's constructed in such a manner that there are no vertical fire stops. A fire in the basement would quickly move up the walls into the attic. In this case the fire got behind the wall in the burn room, and it moved into the attic. This led to a semi-tense moment when we began to believe the controlled-burn would not be as controlled as we would have liked.
Fortunately, the attack crew was able to also get to the attic fire and put that out. They probably got the best training of anyone on that evolution. From that point on, only lower-level burns would be set.
The fire-starters had to stretch in order to keep the structure in good enough working order to be safe for 6 fires, one for each crew. We would not get a second evolution this day, however.
So we began preparations for burning the building down. We loaded it up with bales of hay, wood pallettes, and various other combustibles. Then the building was lit, and we sat back and watched.
My crew was put on pike pole duty. If anything needed to be manipulated, we would be the ones to approach the burning structure and do so.
So we sat back for several minutes, pike poles in hand, watching the fire build up internally. Everyone was speculating as to how they thought the burn would progress. Since the external stucco surface of the house is non-combustible, it would not go up like a traditional wood house. The fire built up to a raging inferno on the inside, like a kiln. Only once the wood was burned away on the inside and the stucco could not support itself would it fall in. This proved to be quite a bit of work for the pike pole crew.
One moment of particular levity came about 10 minutes into the burn, several minutes after the roof started to catch on pretty good. First, one squirrel came barreling out of the roof, jumping the 25 feet or so to the ground, and running straight up the nearest tree. I swear the tail of the squirrel was smoking, and it's belly was singed black. We barely had time to laugh about that, when a second squirrel, and then a third repeated this process. A fourth would follow several more minutes later. How those squirrels decided to stay inside the structure past the initial burn, the attic fire, and then 10 minutes of full-fledged roof fire, I'll never understand.
As the fire progressed, our station took the usual photos directly in front of the burning structure. The heat put off by a burning building is extremely intense. We had one thermal imager that would somehow figure out the temperature of the area the device was pointed at. We saw temperatures as high as 1,800 F on the external surface of the structure. That radiates a great deal of heat. I had my shield down, and Nomex hood on, and still felt the heat quite a bit as we went in with our pike poles to help the walls cave in.
In addition to the intense heat, I had left my sweatshirt on underneath my turnout gear. The outside temperature was about 10 F at 05:30, and I had intended on taking it off later. When the burn progressed to the point that the walls were not supported by much beyond their own weight, we went in to push them in. Turns out to be easier said than done. There was quite a bit of stability left in those walls. I had a 12 foot pike pool stuck into the wall. I had to lean into it with all the effort I could muster, and get the wall rocking in a rhythmic motion to finally topple it in. This was repeated about a dozen times. I was fairly exhausted by this process.
One of the more dangerous aspects of burning a house down is the chimney. This house had 2 chimneys, one external, and one internal. We were able to push one wall into the internal chimney, forcing it to topple. The other chimney was stout and well constructed. It would not topple with the adjoining walls.
We decided to put a smooth bore tip on a handline, crank the pump pressure as much as we could, and try hitting it at the top with the stream. A solid stream can put out quite a bit of force. It took four of us to hold that line it had so much pressure in it, yet it was unable to topple the chimney. It would rock just a few inches at the top, but it was not enough.
Once the house was just a smoldering basement, it was time to start breaking things down and make sure the house was in as safe a condition as possible. We took two handlines to hit the nooks and crannies, and hit the majority of it with a master stream from the engine. We flowed about 1200 GPM for 15 minutes into that basement. The steam put off initially looked like a Nuclear power plant. It's amazing how much heat can be contained by a smolder pile of rubble.
By the end of the day, we had put in about 8 hours of effort. We were all exhausted, but satisfied. These training exercises are so valuable. It helps to just practice things like laying to hydrants, setting up the drop tank, ventilation, etc. When it comes time for a real fire these types of evolutions make for a certain degree of routineness to an emergency. Well, as much as can be expected from chaos, anyway.
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