Sadly, as I expected more details are coming to light that do indicate there was potentially some serious negligence that led to the tragedy. Based upon the statements and facts I'm hearing, there is a serious problem with the Charleston fire department. This was not a single event tragedy, this was an inevitability.
From what I've heard, and from quotes from Charleston command staff, they have not kept up with current guidelines, and even worse seem to indicate ignorance and hostility towards the way the fire service in general has determined is the best way to plan and handle emergencies.
This is unfortunate. There have been many great strides in the way fire emergencies are handled in the last 10 years or so. And the 9/11 tragedy forced us to deal with some issues, and implement proper solutions, and even more importantly created some standards that we can all live by. The goal is not only to prevent further injuries and deaths, but to be prepared for the worst should another national disaster or terrorist event occur.
Since 9/11 Federal guidelines have been put in place that all fire departments are required to comply with. Additionally states have requirements of their own. Sadly, Charleston appears to have been in the dark about these requirements, and 9 firefighters paid the ultimate price for this.
Almost certainly they will receive serious reprimands, and most likely hefty fines from federal organizations such as OSHA, NIOSH, etc. I personally feel there should also be criminal charges for those responsible.
While reading some of the news accounts, some shocking details have emerged. Shocking to me, but apparently they have a deer in the headlights mentality in Charleston, because they just don't quite understand the severity of their actions.
One detail is that it is apparently standard operating procedure for an Incident Commander (IC) to enter a fire structure and become involved with fire operations. The federally mandated NIMS (National Incident Management System) makes the role of the IC quite clear. They are the head coach, they don't get to play in the game. They need to keep the big picture in mind, and communicate to the firefighters the tasks to be carried out.
The IC who was initially in charge of the fire, Assistant Fire Chief Larry Garvin, has been quoted as saying he entered the structure on several occasions to "look for the fire". That is the role of the firefighter, to report back to IC so IC can then make strategic and tactical decisions based upon all of the info. There were internal and external operations going on, by getting involved in the minor details of the operations, he was seriously overlooking the big picture.
Another fact that Charleston has had their head buried in the sand is that they have an SOP that dictates whenever a higher ranking officer arrives on the scene, they automatically become command (IC). This is fine in concept, but the problem is with how they implement it. NIMS dictates that a formal transfer of command must occur. This must be verbal, and recorded. All units on scene must be aware of this change in command. Most importantly the new IC must be informed by the former IC of all strategic and tactical operations, and the status of each. This is something that the Charleston FD does not practice.
This may not have directly led to the tragedy, or have been able to prevent it if implemented, but it's a sign of a problem. The tragedy is the culmination of many of these failure factors.
Another problem was related to the building construction. As I mentioned in my first post about this event, building construction is a vital piece of information for how a fire will behave. I still do not have enough facts about their education about construction types, I'm sure that will come. I certainly hope they are educated about the dangers of various types of construction.
The construction type of the building that collapsed was steel truss. This is exactly the type of construction that I thought the building was, and is one of the most dangerous. Every firefighter should understand the dangers of this construction type, and with 100% certainty every single IC should have a full understanding of it as well.
What dismays me is that the Sofa Super Store was pre-planned. This is a vital part of planning, especially for potentially dangerous locations. The entire point of doing a pre-plan is to plan for the worst and determine how we will handle certain events. This is also an opportunity to warn ourselves about things that we might not notice while in the heat of battle, like the fact the building has a steel truss roof.
What's particularly alarming here is that the pre-plan was created by the same individual who was IC for the first portion of the fire, Larry Garvin. There was no indication of construction type in the preplan. What a valuable asset for the IC to have conducted a pre-plan and determined ahead of time a game plan for handling it. That was a lost opportunity in this case.
Fire fighting is not an exact science, and every emergency is different. That can be difficult to handle. We try to manage this difficult situation with planning and education. A department's leadership is crucial in carrying this out. There are a couple of comments that indicate to me that perhaps the Charleston leadership is questionable. I realize they are dealing with a difficult time, but there are a couple of things I'd like to point out.
When head Fire Chief Rusty Thomas was asked whether he felt his department was in line with Federal and State regulations, his response was "I don't know. I know we have our own". That comment sends chills down my spine. For a fire chief responsible for the safety and livelihood of many individuals who want to learn how to best help people and handle emergencies to not even know if he's in compliance. To me that seems like blind ignorance. Not the type of person I want to follow, particularly charging into a burning building at his behest.
Chief Thomas also indicated that sending the IC into a building, something he admits they do often, does not compromise his commander's ability. This is something that is completely contradictory to what the current line of thinking is, and has been emphasized through such requirements as NIMS. NIOSH has reported in similar previous incidents that this is a contributing factor to disasters such as this, and is something to be avoided. I have no doubt the same will be said for this incident when the report is final.
The last comment I heard that really got me upset was once again Chief Thomas. When asked about the transfer of command process and his departments lack of compliance with recommended practices, he responded "I'm just going to let you know we have our own incident command system. We have it written that the highest-ranking official is automatically in charge. I don't care how it is anyplace else." That indicates to me that his head is firmly buried in the sand, and he is not interested in ensuring that his department is doing everything they can to implement the best and safest procedures for their department and community.
The problem's here are sadly probably not that uncommon. It's really the sum total of the failures that caused this circumstance. I don't mean to sound overly critical, but some of these comments really upset me. My belief is that nearly every firefighter injury and death is completely preventable. Hearing what I've heard thus far about this incident, it only confirms my beliefs. If they had been proactive rather than status-quo about their policies and procedures, I believe any one of the failure points that led to this tragedy could have prevented these firefighter deaths.
Let us hope that the publicity this event has generated will result in not only the Charleston fire department reevaluating their attitude and policies, but also the many other departments out there that have been living by the same beliefs.
There is not a single department out there that has it all figured out and can assume they are doing things correctly. We must constantly adapt, improve, educate ourselves, and work together with others in the fire service to make our jobs safer. It is a never-ending battle. Unlike Chief Thomas, I do care how everyone else is doing it.
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Monday, June 25, 2007
Fire Tragedy
The recent tragedy in Charleston, SC that killed 9 firefighters is a stark reminder of the dangers of firefighting. Their sacrifice is truly tragic. And almost certainly it was preventable.
The United States fire service seems to be more "tolerant" of fire risk than other countries. Our firefighter morality rates are generally higher than most other countries in the world. This should not be necessary. Every single firefighter death should be preventable in some way.
Nearly every year the statistics are the same. On average around 100 firefighters are dying. What's really telling is that this is grossly disproportionate to the general long term trend of decreasing emergencies and fires.
Why are we so tolerant of firefighter deaths? Not only should our mortality rates be declining in proportion to the decrease in fires, shouldn't we also see an added reduction in injuries and deaths due to our increased technology and training? It's not happening.
Getting back to the Charleston fire, I haven't heard many of the details. To the best of my knowledge many of these details are either currently unknown, or have yet to be released.
OSHA investigates each firefighter death, as well as NIOSH. I like to read the NIOSH reports. They detail what happened, how it happened, and what should be done to prevent similar accidents in the future. It amazes me at the things they detail in their report. Most of the time it turns out to be things that should be incredibly obvious. Like wearing your seat belt. Or using equipment properly, and maintaining equipment and apparatus. Many times it comes down to general training and safety issues.
Based upon what I do know about the Charleston fire, my personal belief is that this was definitely preventable. I'm sure there will be details to come out to alter my opinion in one way or another. For example, I listened to the released 911 tapes. It was only the police tapes, but from them I was able to hear reports of multiple trapped victims (which was contrary to initial reports of no one inside).
A trapped victim changes things dramatically. That gives us a reason as firefighters to be
in a burning building. Although we can never accept trading our own lives for those of the initial victims. From the rough time line I got from the 911 tapes, however, it sounded like the victims were rescued early in the incident.
So why were there 9 firefighters in a heavily involved building? Another important detail is that the building collapsed at least an hour an a half after the initial report. That's a long time for fire to build.
Building construction is a vital part of how a fire plays out. I'm not familiar with the details of the collapsed building's construction type, or the generally accepted construction types of that region. But based upon the type of store, and the end result, my guess is that it was some sort of lightweight construction.
Lightweight construction is great for the building owner. It greatly reduces the amount of construction materials necessary to build a building. It provides strengths equal to or greater than older construction methods which relied on a great deal of material. It's a win-win, right? Wrong. The one weakness in lightweight construction is that because of the reduction in the amount of material, buildings will fail much, much sooner under fire load.
In fact, I live by the belief that a lightweight construction building can fail within 10 minutes of fire load. And the most common outcome of failure in these types of buildings is a roof collapse. There is really no warning of these types of failures. The roof fails all at once.
This sounds a lot like what happened in Charleston. I really hope the Incident Commander and crew leaders were well versed in the dangers of lightweight construction, and took this into account. Unfortunately, I think it was overlooked, or even worse was not something they were even fully aware of. If it was, this was a completely preventable tragedy. In fact nearly every tragedy should be preventable.
Everyone from the IC down to the probie on the interior crew, should be aware of how building construction affects our response. If 9 were killed, there were likely others in the building at the same time. Did any one of them think about all of that fire load, and how it was affecting the structure? If all of the victims were out of the building, what were firefighters still doing inside? There was nothing to be gained, the building was well past it's deductible and was going to be a total loss. There was heavy fire load (it was a Sofa store: lots and lots of synthetic materials). After an hour and a half, even a traditional heavy construction building would be nearing the failure point. Why did this tragedy need to happen?
It may be a year before we hear a full report from NIOSH. I hope these firefighters did not die in vain. One thing that has definitely resulted is a lot of publicity from this event. 9 firefighters is a large number, even for us in the US. It is garnering attention. Let's hope at least the fire community can learn from this and prevent future tragedies from happening.
The United States fire service seems to be more "tolerant" of fire risk than other countries. Our firefighter morality rates are generally higher than most other countries in the world. This should not be necessary. Every single firefighter death should be preventable in some way.
Nearly every year the statistics are the same. On average around 100 firefighters are dying. What's really telling is that this is grossly disproportionate to the general long term trend of decreasing emergencies and fires.
Why are we so tolerant of firefighter deaths? Not only should our mortality rates be declining in proportion to the decrease in fires, shouldn't we also see an added reduction in injuries and deaths due to our increased technology and training? It's not happening.
Getting back to the Charleston fire, I haven't heard many of the details. To the best of my knowledge many of these details are either currently unknown, or have yet to be released.
OSHA investigates each firefighter death, as well as NIOSH. I like to read the NIOSH reports. They detail what happened, how it happened, and what should be done to prevent similar accidents in the future. It amazes me at the things they detail in their report. Most of the time it turns out to be things that should be incredibly obvious. Like wearing your seat belt. Or using equipment properly, and maintaining equipment and apparatus. Many times it comes down to general training and safety issues.
Based upon what I do know about the Charleston fire, my personal belief is that this was definitely preventable. I'm sure there will be details to come out to alter my opinion in one way or another. For example, I listened to the released 911 tapes. It was only the police tapes, but from them I was able to hear reports of multiple trapped victims (which was contrary to initial reports of no one inside).
A trapped victim changes things dramatically. That gives us a reason as firefighters to be
in a burning building. Although we can never accept trading our own lives for those of the initial victims. From the rough time line I got from the 911 tapes, however, it sounded like the victims were rescued early in the incident.
So why were there 9 firefighters in a heavily involved building? Another important detail is that the building collapsed at least an hour an a half after the initial report. That's a long time for fire to build.
Building construction is a vital part of how a fire plays out. I'm not familiar with the details of the collapsed building's construction type, or the generally accepted construction types of that region. But based upon the type of store, and the end result, my guess is that it was some sort of lightweight construction.
Lightweight construction is great for the building owner. It greatly reduces the amount of construction materials necessary to build a building. It provides strengths equal to or greater than older construction methods which relied on a great deal of material. It's a win-win, right? Wrong. The one weakness in lightweight construction is that because of the reduction in the amount of material, buildings will fail much, much sooner under fire load.
In fact, I live by the belief that a lightweight construction building can fail within 10 minutes of fire load. And the most common outcome of failure in these types of buildings is a roof collapse. There is really no warning of these types of failures. The roof fails all at once.
This sounds a lot like what happened in Charleston. I really hope the Incident Commander and crew leaders were well versed in the dangers of lightweight construction, and took this into account. Unfortunately, I think it was overlooked, or even worse was not something they were even fully aware of. If it was, this was a completely preventable tragedy. In fact nearly every tragedy should be preventable.
Everyone from the IC down to the probie on the interior crew, should be aware of how building construction affects our response. If 9 were killed, there were likely others in the building at the same time. Did any one of them think about all of that fire load, and how it was affecting the structure? If all of the victims were out of the building, what were firefighters still doing inside? There was nothing to be gained, the building was well past it's deductible and was going to be a total loss. There was heavy fire load (it was a Sofa store: lots and lots of synthetic materials). After an hour and a half, even a traditional heavy construction building would be nearing the failure point. Why did this tragedy need to happen?
It may be a year before we hear a full report from NIOSH. I hope these firefighters did not die in vain. One thing that has definitely resulted is a lot of publicity from this event. 9 firefighters is a large number, even for us in the US. It is garnering attention. Let's hope at least the fire community can learn from this and prevent future tragedies from happening.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
