More Details on Charleston Tragedy

Sadly, as I expected more details are coming to light that do indicate there was potentially some serious negligence that led to the tragedy. Based upon the statements and facts I'm hearing, there is a serious problem with the Charleston fire department. This was not a single event tragedy, this was an inevitability.

From what I've heard, and from quotes from Charleston command staff, they have not kept up with current guidelines, and even worse seem to indicate ignorance and hostility towards the way the fire service in general has determined is the best way to plan and handle emergencies.

This is unfortunate. There have been many great strides in the way fire emergencies are handled in the last 10 years or so. And the 9/11 tragedy forced us to deal with some issues, and implement proper solutions, and even more importantly created some standards that we can all live by. The goal is not only to prevent further injuries and deaths, but to be prepared for the worst should another national disaster or terrorist event occur.

Since 9/11 Federal guidelines have been put in place that all fire departments are required to comply with. Additionally states have requirements of their own. Sadly, Charleston appears to have been in the dark about these requirements, and 9 firefighters paid the ultimate price for this.

Almost certainly they will receive serious reprimands, and most likely hefty fines from federal organizations such as OSHA, NIOSH, etc. I personally feel there should also be criminal charges for those responsible.

While reading some of the news accounts, some shocking details have emerged. Shocking to me, but apparently they have a deer in the headlights mentality in Charleston, because they just don't quite understand the severity of their actions.

One detail is that it is apparently standard operating procedure for an Incident Commander (IC) to enter a fire structure and become involved with fire operations. The federally mandated NIMS (National Incident Management System) makes the role of the IC quite clear. They are the head coach, they don't get to play in the game. They need to keep the big picture in mind, and communicate to the firefighters the tasks to be carried out.

The IC who was initially in charge of the fire, Assistant Fire Chief Larry Garvin, has been quoted as saying he entered the structure on several occasions to "look for the fire". That is the role of the firefighter, to report back to IC so IC can then make strategic and tactical decisions based upon all of the info. There were internal and external operations going on, by getting involved in the minor details of the operations, he was seriously overlooking the big picture.

Another fact that Charleston has had their head buried in the sand is that they have an SOP that dictates whenever a higher ranking officer arrives on the scene, they automatically become command (IC). This is fine in concept, but the problem is with how they implement it. NIMS dictates that a formal transfer of command must occur. This must be verbal, and recorded. All units on scene must be aware of this change in command. Most importantly the new IC must be informed by the former IC of all strategic and tactical operations, and the status of each. This is something that the Charleston FD does not practice.

This may not have directly led to the tragedy, or have been able to prevent it if implemented, but it's a sign of a problem. The tragedy is the culmination of many of these failure factors.

Another problem was related to the building construction. As I mentioned in my first post about this event, building construction is a vital piece of information for how a fire will behave. I still do not have enough facts about their education about construction types, I'm sure that will come. I certainly hope they are educated about the dangers of various types of construction.

The construction type of the building that collapsed was steel truss. This is exactly the type of construction that I thought the building was, and is one of the most dangerous. Every firefighter should understand the dangers of this construction type, and with 100% certainty every single IC should have a full understanding of it as well.

What dismays me is that the Sofa Super Store was pre-planned. This is a vital part of planning, especially for potentially dangerous locations. The entire point of doing a pre-plan is to plan for the worst and determine how we will handle certain events. This is also an opportunity to warn ourselves about things that we might not notice while in the heat of battle, like the fact the building has a steel truss roof.

What's particularly alarming here is that the pre-plan was created by the same individual who was IC for the first portion of the fire, Larry Garvin. There was no indication of construction type in the preplan. What a valuable asset for the IC to have conducted a pre-plan and determined ahead of time a game plan for handling it. That was a lost opportunity in this case.

Fire fighting is not an exact science, and every emergency is different. That can be difficult to handle. We try to manage this difficult situation with planning and education. A department's leadership is crucial in carrying this out. There are a couple of comments that indicate to me that perhaps the Charleston leadership is questionable. I realize they are dealing with a difficult time, but there are a couple of things I'd like to point out.

When head Fire Chief Rusty Thomas was asked whether he felt his department was in line with Federal and State regulations, his response was "I don't know. I know we have our own". That comment sends chills down my spine. For a fire chief responsible for the safety and livelihood of many individuals who want to learn how to best help people and handle emergencies to not even know if he's in compliance. To me that seems like blind ignorance. Not the type of person I want to follow, particularly charging into a burning building at his behest.

Chief Thomas also indicated that sending the IC into a building, something he admits they do often, does not compromise his commander's ability. This is something that is completely contradictory to what the current line of thinking is, and has been emphasized through such requirements as NIMS. NIOSH has reported in similar previous incidents that this is a contributing factor to disasters such as this, and is something to be avoided. I have no doubt the same will be said for this incident when the report is final.

The last comment I heard that really got me upset was once again Chief Thomas. When asked about the transfer of command process and his departments lack of compliance with recommended practices, he responded "I'm just going to let you know we have our own incident command system. We have it written that the highest-ranking official is automatically in charge. I don't care how it is anyplace else." That indicates to me that his head is firmly buried in the sand, and he is not interested in ensuring that his department is doing everything they can to implement the best and safest procedures for their department and community.

The problem's here are sadly probably not that uncommon. It's really the sum total of the failures that caused this circumstance. I don't mean to sound overly critical, but some of these comments really upset me. My belief is that nearly every firefighter injury and death is completely preventable. Hearing what I've heard thus far about this incident, it only confirms my beliefs. If they had been proactive rather than status-quo about their policies and procedures, I believe any one of the failure points that led to this tragedy could have prevented these firefighter deaths.

Let us hope that the publicity this event has generated will result in not only the Charleston fire department reevaluating their attitude and policies, but also the many other departments out there that have been living by the same beliefs.

There is not a single department out there that has it all figured out and can assume they are doing things correctly. We must constantly adapt, improve, educate ourselves, and work together with others in the fire service to make our jobs safer. It is a never-ending battle. Unlike Chief Thomas, I do care how everyone else is doing it.